Prescription Pharmaceutical Products: A More Stringent Standard of Trademark Infringement by Johnson, Wayne A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 3 Article 10
1972
Prescription Pharmaceutical Products: A More
Stringent Standard of Trademark Infringement
Wayne A. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wayne A. Johnson, Prescription Pharmaceutical Products: A More Stringent Standard of Trademark Infringement, 26 Sw L.J. 638 (1972)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol26/iss3/10
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Prescription Pharmaceutical Products: A More Stringent
Standard of Trademark Infringement
Syntex Laboratories, Inc., owner of the registered trademark "Vagitrol,"
instituted a trademark infringement action seeking to prevent Norwich Phar-
macal Company from using its unregistered mark "Vagestrol." The district
court granted Syntex's motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined Nor-
wich pendente lite from using the term "Vagestrol" in any further advertising
or sale of a vaginal suppository. On appeal, Norwich claimed that the district
court applied a more stringent standard of trademark infringement to these
prescription pharmaceutical products than the courts have applied to products
in general, and that such application was unwarranted in light of precedent.
Held, affirmed: When confusion between plaintiff's and defendant's trademarks
could lead to the use of the wrong product and result in physical harm to the
consuming public, a stricter standard regarding infringement is entirely in
accord with public policy, and its application is appropriate. Syntex Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971).
I. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENTS: LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The development of modern trademark law was slow and confused, and the
need for appropriate legislation was soon apparent.1 The United States Con-
gress responded in 1870 with its first federal trademark act.' After this act was
declared unconstitutional, several other acts and amendments followed.' The
statute presently in use is the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946.'
In an action for trademark infringement, the issue usually is whether the
defendant's use of a trademark similar to the plaintiff's creates a likelihood of
confusion. Two basic types of confusion were recognized under the Act of
1905: confusion of goods, and confusion of businesses.' Confusion of goods
resulted when an "ordinarily prudent purchaser would be liable to purchase
one product in the belief that he was purchasing the other."' Confusion of
14 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 568 (3d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as CALLMANN].2 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 77, 16 Stat. 210. This Act was entitled "An Act to
revise, consolidate and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights."
' United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); cf. United States Printing Co. v. Griggs
& Co., 279 U.S. 156 (1929).
'Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Star. 502. This Act apparently satisfied the constitu-
tional imperatives. See United States ex rel. South Carolina v. Seymour, 153 U.S. 353
(1894); Rossman v. Garnier, 211 F. 401 (8th Cit. 1914); Louis Bergdoll Brewing Co.
v. Bergdoll Brewing Co., 218 F. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1914). But see Illinois Watch-Case Co. v.
Elgin Nat'l Watch Co., 94 F. 667 (7th Cir. 1889), a/I'd, 179 U.S. 665 (1901).
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533. This Act included amendments to the
1905 Act. Id. §§ 6, 9.
5 Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §S 1051-1127
(1970)).
6 Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, S 5, 33 Stat. 724. See also 3 CALLMANN 539.
73 CALLMANN 541. See also Seven-Up Co. v. Get Up Corp., 340 F.2d 954 (6th Cit.
1965); United Drug Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 111 F.2d 997 (8th Cit. 1940); Fidelity
Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Fidelity Mortgage Co., 12 F.2d 582 (6th Cit. 1926); Jean Patou,
Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
[Vol. 26
NOTES
this sort was applicable only to products actually in competition.8 Confusion of
businesses occurred when a consumer believed that he was dealing with one
business when in fact he was dealing with another.' Confusion at this level
could arise between noncompetitive as well as competitive parties."0 Although
these distinctions were initially of importance in decisions regarding trademark
infringement actions, many modern courts have tended to consider the issue of
confusion in a more general manner, discounting the importance of the "type"
of confusion involved."
As originally enacted, the Lanham Act protected the owner of a registered
trademark from use by another person of a similar mark that was "likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to source of origin" of
the goods or services." At first glance, it would appear that the words "as to
source of origin" would preclude the court from considering confusion of the
goods themselves. Indeed, in one of the first cases to interpret the Lanham Act,
California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co.,3 the court held
that a claim of infringement would be disallowed unless there was confusion
concerning the source of origin. Many courts followed this interpretation,"
although one authority has suggested that these restrictive words should have
been dismissed and attributed only to inartistic draftsmanship." The confusion
over this particular problem was eliminated, however, with the clarifying
amendment of October 9, 1962," which deleted the words "purchasers as to
source of origin." The Act now requires a showing only that the alleged in-
fringer's use is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. ,
1
7
An issue which often arises in trademark infringement actions involves the
s3 CALLMANN 550. See also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco
Rubber Co., 153 F.2d 662 (1st Cit. 1946), in which the court stated that the absence of
actual competition between the parties may indicate no likelihood of confusion.
'See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk v. Frank, 198 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1961); Dodge Bros.
v. East, 8 F.2d 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, 235 Cal.
App. 2d 549, 45 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1965).
103 CALLMANN 551.
"See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. Heald Mach. Co., 385 F.2d 456 (C.C.P.A. 1967);
Tiffany & Co. v. L'Argene Prods. Co., 67 Misc. 2d 384, 324 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
But see Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293 (9th
Cir. 1971).
"Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Star. 427.
"166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947). The court stated that there was little likelihood that
confusion as to source of origin could occur between fruits and vegetables on the one hand,
and bakery products on the other, since these products are neither competitive nor of the
same general class. Id. at 973.
'
4 See, e.g., Brown & Bigelow v. B'B Pen Co., 191 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1951), in which
the court stated that the "plaintiff would be in unfair competition with the defendant if its
use of the symbol . ..would give a false impression that plaintiff's goods emanate from
defendant." Id. at 943. See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Lincoln Labs., Inc., 322 F.2d 968
(7th Cir. 1963); G. Leblanc Corp. v. H & A Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1962);
Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v. J.R. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1962).
1"3 CALLMANN 540. Sections 2(d) and 45 of the Lanham Act, dealing with registra-
tion of trademarks, were directed at marks likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to de-
ceive purchasers. Section 32(1), declaring the user of a mark civilly liable for infringement,
seemed more restrictive in referring to marks likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to
deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods. Since the Lanham Act was
meant to broaden the rights of the trademark owner, Callmann argues that this difference
in language should be dismissed. Id.
'"Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, S 17, 76 Stat. 773 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
1114(1) (1970)).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970).
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category of persons who must be confused by the similarity in the marks. The
test is generally phrased in terms of the likelihood of confusion by the ordi-
narily prudent purchaser of the particular goods, buying under the normally
prevalent conditions of the market, and giving the attention such purchasers
usually give in buying that class of goods." Many courts will take into con-
sideration the particular skill of the purchaser, or his familiarity with the
product area." In addition, the test has traditionally been applied to consumers
rather than experienced retailers and wholesalers."'
In construing the language of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, the courts have
also been concerned with the meaning of the term "likelihood" as used in the
Act. Generally, "likelihood" is defined as "probability,"" with a mere possi-
bility of confusion being insufficient for relief from infringement."
II. MEDICINES AND PHARMACEUTICALS: A DIFFERENT STANDARD
The confusion of goods in the field of medicines and pharmaceuticals has
a greater potential to cause harm than the confusion of ordinary goods. For
example, a product intended for external use may be mistakenly purchased
for internal use, and its use result in severe consequences. In addition, some
medicinal products may be purchased directly by the consumer, while others
may be available only by prescription. With such varied methods of purchase
and use attached to medicines and pharmaceuticals, and with such a potential
for harm resulting from confusion, in infringement actions it is necessary to
examine carefully each stage in the offering, ordering, sale, and use of these
products."
In cases involving goods sold only on prescription, confusion is considered
less likely than when products move competitively through the same trade
channels. 4 However, the fact that one product is sold only by prescription and
"Nebraska Consol. Mills Co. v. Shawnee Milling Co., 198 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952);
Stephano Bros. v. Stamatopoulos, 238 F. 89 (2d Cir. 1916); Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. United
Whelan Corp., 22 Misc. 2d 532, 197 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also American
Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1953) (likelihood of con-
fusion by careless customer sufficient if imitation was intentional); Stork Restaurant, Inc.
v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948) (likelihood of confusion by innocent and gullible
customer sufficient).
19See, e.g., American Mfg. Co. v. Heald Machs., 385 F.2d 456 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Na-
tional Motor Bearing Co. v. James-Pond-Clark, 266 F.2d 799 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Tarrant Mfg. Co., 219 F.2d 716 (C.C.P.A. 1955); Chicago Pneu-
matic Tool Co. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 157 F.2d 201 (C.C.P.A. 1946); W.A. Baum &
Co. v. Becton,'Dickinson & Co., 20 F. Supp. 707 (D.N.J. 1937).
"J. CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 337 (1970). See also
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 462 (3d Cir. 1968);
0. & W. Thum v. Dickinson, 245 F. 609 (6th Cir. 1917).
" General Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. General Ins. Adjustment Co., 381 F.2d 991 (10th
Cir. 1967); Squirrel Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co., 224 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1955).
"Coca-Cola Co. v. Nehi Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 318, 36 A.2d 156, 165 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
F. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE 138, 139 (2d ed. 1968).
"3 1 A. SEIDEL, S. DUBROFF & E. GONDA, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE 421
(1963).
S 4 See Endo Prods., Inc. v. National Package Drugs, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q. 250, 251
(Comm'r 1954), in which the Commissioner noted: "For example, are the products sold
over the counter or by prescription only? If both are sold over the counter, are they of the
same potency? Are the intended uses of the products substantially the same, i.e., for internal
or external use?" See also Dolcin Corp. v. Harvey Labs., Inc., 112 U.S.P.Q. 143 (Comm'r
1957) (One product was limited to sale for use by physicians only, while the other product
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another over the counter may not be sufficient to avoid the likelihood of con-
fusion if other factors are given more weight. It may be determined that even
though likelihood of confusion is slight, the nature of the medicine is such
that the use of one product when another product is prescribed could have
dangerous effects. When such potential for harm is exposed, the Patent Office
may refuse an application for registration of a trademark which is similar to a
previously registered mark.'
The Patent Office has many times looked to the confusion not only of con-
sumers, but also of physicians and pharmacists, particularly when the goods
are dispensed by prescription only.2" The particular skill of the physicians and
pharmacists is taken into account in determining the likelihood of confusion."
Since the purchasers in these cases are professionals, they fall outside the cate-
gory of average, unwary purchasers, and are held to a higher standard of ability
to distinguish between goods. However, it is recognized that these professionals
are not immune to confusion or mistake, and the marks must be sufficiently
distinguishable to avoid likelihood of confusion.28
III. SYNTEX LABORATORIES, INC. V. NORWICH PHARMACAL CO.-
A PUBLIC POLICY DECISION
The defendant's contention, in Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Phar-
macal Co.,"5 was that the district court applied an unwarranted and excessively
stringent standard of trademark infringement. First, defendant Norwich con-
tended that the standard looked to confusion of the products themselves by
physicians and pharmacists instead of to confusion among ordinarily prudent
purchasers as to source of origin. Secondly, Norwich contended that the
standard applied was unnecessarily stringent on the issue of the likelihood of
confusion.
The court answered the first contention by referring to section 32 ( 1 ) of the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act, taking special notice of the 1962 amendment." The
court noted that a portion of the statute was eliminated by the amendment,
thereby evincing, as the court stated, "a clear purpose to outlaw the use of
trademarks which are likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any
was sold over the counter to the general public. The court looked not only to the fact that
the average purchaser of the products was different, but also to the differences of the phy-
sical properties of the products, the purposes of the products, and the differences in the
marks.); Ex parte Chicago Pharmacal Co., 102 U.S.P.Q. 414 (Comm'r 1954).
2 Merritt Corp. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 277 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1960). See note 34
infra, and accompanying text.
26 Under the present Act, the confusing similarity test is identical in both registration
proceedings and in the infringement section.27 Baxter Labs., Inc. v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q. 216 (Comm'r 1954). It
was pointed out that the products were not sold to the average, ordinary, and unwary pur-
chaser, and under such circumstances it was not believed that confusion, mistake, or de-
ception was likely to occur.
2 R.J. Strasenburgh Co. v. Kenwood Labs., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q. 379 (Comm'r 1955).
The court pointed out that the likelihood of confusion among physicians and pharmacists
was enhanced by the practice of telephoning prescriptions to the pharmacist, and by the
frequent passing of illegible handwritten prescriptions from the physician to the pharmacist.
Id. at 380.
29437 F.2d 566 (2d Cit. 1971).
"
0See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
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kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as to source of origin.""5
The legislative history, however, does not indicate so clearly the purpose
which the court attributes to the Congress in excluding these particular words.
Although the Senate report states that "[tihe word 'purchasers' [was] elimi-
nated so as to avoid the possibility of misconstruction of the present language
•.. ,,," the report further states that the misconstruction arose because the pro-
vision was meant to apply to potential purchasers as well as actual purchasers.
No mention is made in the report that the term was eliminated to extend the
application of the test to anyone other than actual or potential purchasers.
Cases from the Patent Office concerning registration objections, however,
have indicated that potential confusion among physicians and pharmacists is
an important factor in the determination of whether a similar mark should be
registered.' Since the Lanham Trade-Mark Act tests for both infringement
and registration of a trademark are identical," it would appear that confusion
among physicians and pharmacists would certainly be a factor to be examined
in infringement actions.'
With respect to defendant Norwich's contention that the correct standard
of trademark infringement is one which looks to the likelihood of confusion
as to source of origin rather than likelihood of confusion of goods, the court
pointed to the "clear purpose" of the Congress in omitting the words "source
of origin" in the 1962 amendment. Although the legislative history does not
indicate why these words were omitted, it is indeed clear from case law that
courts do look to product confusion as well as confusion as to source of origin
in determining whether a particular mark has been infringed.'
The defendant's second contention, that the district court looked only for
a possibility of confusion rather than a likelihood of confusion, was also un-
successful. First, the court said that it was not clear whether the district court
had indeed applied a separate standard, since there was evidence of a sub-
stantial likelihood of confusion under the normal "likelihood" test. 7 However,
the second Circuit held that even if the district judge did find confusion only
31437 F.2d at 568.
32 S. REP. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
a See cases cited notes 27, 28 supra.
-15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1970) provides a remedy for trademark infringement against
"fa]ny person who shall, without consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce any
... colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale . . . of any goods
... on or in connection with such use which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take or to deceive .... "
15 U.S.C. S 1052(d) (1970) provides that "[n~o trademark . . . shall be refused
registration . . . unless it-(d) . . . so resembles a mark registered in the Patent Office
... as to be likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive .... "
15 U.S.C. 5 1127 (1970) defines "colorable imitation" as including "any mark which
so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive."
35See Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G.D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1958),
where the court stated that in view of the fact that the two medicinal products were dis-
pensed only upon prescription by a physician, the inquiry was limited to the likelihood of
confusion within the specialized group of physicians and pharmacists.
" See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 462
(3d Cir. 1968); John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 1966);
David Sherman Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377 (8th Cit. 1965).
7The district court judge found that the two marks were similar, both visually and
phonetically, that the intended use of the products was for treatment of medically related
conditions, and that the products were likely to be closely associated in the minds of those
who prescribe and dispense them. 437 F.2d at 569.
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upon proof of a possibility of confusion, such a conclusion was correct. In so
concluding, the court of appeals stated that where "[c]onfusion between plain-
tiff's and defendant's marks... could result in physical harm to the consuming
public, whether through failure to receive effective medication or through ad-
verse reaction to inadvertently prescribed or dispensed drugs . . . a stricter
standard ... seems desirable.""
The court's conclusion was a specific approval of the rationale in Morgen-
stern Chemical Co. v. G.D. Searle & Co." that public policy may demand less
exacting proof of confusing similarity in the field of medicines and pharma-
ceuticals. The precedent for such a lesser proof of confusion, however limited,
certainly illustrates the better view. Although the use of such a standard has
been condemned, ° in cases involving medicines and pharmaceuticals some
courts have realized the potential harm to the public and have proceeded with
caution when rendering an infringement decision or allowing registration of a
similar mark. 1 These decisions reflect a consumer protection philosophy based
on sound public policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been stated that "[tlhere is no ineluctable rule to test infringing simi-
larity or 'likelihood of confusion.' Each case is decided on its own merits."'
Thus, it is submitted that when the merits of a case involve strong public policy
considerations, those considerations should prevail. The decision in Syntex,
while keeping within the language of the statute, correctly included the im-
portant issues of public benefit and protection.
In the ordinary infringement action, the concern is generally with damage to
the plaintiff in a monetary sense; if the infringement is allowed to continue,
it is possible the plaintiff's business may suffer. Infringement actions concern-
ing medicines and pharmaceuticals, however, are not ordinary in the sense
that the concern is not only with monetary damage, but with bodily harm as
well. When confusion of medicinal products could result in physical harm to
the consuming public, a standard requiring that only a possibility of confusion
need be shown is not only desirable, but indeed necessary.
Wayne A. Johnson
38 Id.
19253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1958). Morgenstern involved similar trade-names of two
products, both products dispensed by prescription, yet prescribed for radically different con-
ditions and for different uses and desired effects. The court reasoned that in such circum-
stances the prevention of confusion and mistakes was too vital to be trifled with.4 See, e.g., Squirrel Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co., 224 F.2d 840, 844 (5th Cit. 1955),
in which the stated test was "whether there is a probability that the average person will be
confused ...... See also Coca-Cola v. Nehi Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 318, 36 A.2d 156,
165 (Sup. Ct. 1944), in which the court stated that "the likelihood of deception must be
reasonably probable and not merely speculative."
"'See, e.g., Merritt Corp. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 277 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1960); R.J.
Strasenburg Co. v. Kenwood Labs., Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q. 379 (Comm'r 1955); Cole Chem.
Co. v. Cole Labs., 118 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Mo. 1954).
'Bakers Associates, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 296 F. Supp. 772, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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